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Chief Executive Officer Compensation: A Comparison
the Stock Market's Reaction to
Alternative Incentive Structures
Jensen and Murphy have advocated that the level of a CEO's compensation is
not as important as the "how" of the incentive package. They identified two
sets of twenty-five CEOs whose compensation package is "best" and "least"
aligned with the interests of the shareholders. An analysis of these "best" and
"worst" aligned firms' stock returns indicates that the market did not place a
consistent return premium on pay for performance CEO firms versus
misaligned CEO incentive firms during 1989 through 1990. These findings
persist when one controls for CEO change as well as regulatory-interest rate
influences. Although these empirical data appear the contradict the Jensen and
Murphy position, capital market efficiency arguments suggest that one might
expect these results to occur.
Issues regarding the compensation of U.S. corporate executives have received
increased attention in recent years. In February 1992, the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) shifted away from its long held position that management compensation
is a matter of "ordinary business." Richard Breeden, Chairman of the SEC at that time,
played an active role this controversy. Under his direction, the SEC decided to give
shareholders the right to vote on proposals that limit executive pay, although these votes
were not to be binding. See Salwen [16].
In early 1992, the SEC ruled that shareholders can change corporate bylaws
governing executive compensation, and the Commission announced proposals that would
require corporations to value executive stock options in a uniform way [16]. Last June, the
SEC proposed new regulations that would overhaul restrictive policies on shareholder
communication in order to allow freer discussion before proxy votes. The proposals would
permit shareholders to vote for individual members of the board of directors rather than a
slate of directors. The regulations would also require corporations to spell out how each top
executive is paid in salary, bonus, options, restricted stock as well as several other pay
categories [17]. In addition these regulations, which were approved in October, 1992, also
require that annual reports contain charts that compare pay rates with stock price
performance [13]. In effect the new SEC mandates require corporate compensation
committees to reveal how executive compensation levels are determined and how the
packages relate to company performance.
Recently, a rich and growing literature focusing on issues that fall under the rubric of
corporate governance or the market for corporate control has developed. As early as the
1930s, Berle and Means [1] stressed the possibility of conflicts between widely dispersed
shareholders and managers who have little ownership interest. Jensen and Meckling [8]
developed a theoretical framework that could identify the costs of these principal-agent
conflicts. These path breaking insights provided a robust series of paradigms to analyze such
diverse issues as leveraged buyouts (LBOs), mergers and acquisitions, takeovers, corporate
board structure and executive compensation. See Varian [19] as well as Jensen and Warner
[11] and Mandelker and Marr [14] for an excellent overview of a sampling of the corporate
control literature.
Crystal [4] documents a number of institutional practices which fail to link CEO
compensation with the economic interests of the shareholders. Jensen and Murphy [9 & 10]
have investigated CEO incentives. They suggest that the level of a CEO's compensation is
not as important as the "how" of the incentive package. They contend large rewards for
outstanding performance and meaningful penalties (including dismissal) for poor performance
mitigate many shareholder-manager conflicts. One of the most interesting aspects of Jensen
and Murphy's research is the methodology they have developed to estimate CEO pay for
performance. Their model attempts to capture the dollar compensation impact resulting from
a $1,(X)0 change in aggregate shareholder wealth. Jensen and Murphy calculate an estimate
of this compensation per $1,000 in aggregate market value for each CEO in the 250 largest
(based upon 1988 sales) U.S. public corporations included in the Forbes executive
compensation surveys from 1975 through 1989. Based upon these data, they present a survey
of the 25 "best incentive" and the 25 "worst incentive" CEOs. The top and bottom incentive
compensation CEOs and their firms are presented in Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively.
If the position taken by Jensen and Murphy is valid, one would expect the risk-
adjusted returns of the 25 "best incentive" firms to be positive and relatively larger than the
25 "worst incentive" firms in their sample. This logic is based upon the argument that a
"best incentive" CEO would clearly have a economic motivation to pursue an aggressive
strategy of undertaking all possible positive net present value (NPV) investment
opportunities. In contrast, a "worst incentive" CEO would have less economic motivation in
aggressively perusing positive NPV investment opportunities. Indeed it is possible that
negative NPV investments have a higher probability of being undertaken by a corporation
lead by a "worst incentive" CEO. For example a misaligned CEO might support the
development of an economically foolish product such as a "smokeless" cigarette or the
acquisition of a large fleet of executive corporate jets, that could be used for corporate as
well as non-reimbursed personal trips. See Burrough and Helyar's enlightening account of
this type of corporate behavior in their discussion of the takeover battie for RJR Nabisco [2].
Differences in economic motivation among CEOs could drive the "best incentive" firms to
undertake fewer negative NPV investments vis-a-vis the "worst incentive" firms. As
investments are made over time, positive (negative) NPV investments generate positive
(negative) excess returns.
Proponents of the "strong," and perhaps and perhaps even "semi-strong" form of the
efficient capital market (ECM) hypothesis would not agree with the scenario described above.
In an ECM, a set of information is completely and instantaneously reflected in market prices.
The information set of the "strong" form contains all public and private (i.e., insider)
information; the "semi-strong" from information set contains all public information.
Supporters of ECM would argue that once a CEO's incentive compensation classification
category becomes part of the market's relevant information set, stock prices would
immediately adjust to this good or bad news regarding future positive or negative NPV
investments. Once the information is imbedded in stock prices, subsequent excess returns
should be zero, unless of course, unanticipated and\or new events enter the relevant
information set. Perfect foresight would completely eliminate excess returns. However, the
unanticipated adoption of a negative (positive) NPV project will result in negative (positive)
excess returns. The presence of excess returns will be critically dependent upon at least three
economic conditions. The first is closely aligned with the Jensen and Murphy pay-for-
performance perspective. It is dependent upon the degree to which CEOs and their
management teams consistently pursue hard-nosed shareholder wealth maximization policies.
The second and third conditions are jointly related to the efficiency of capital markets, the
accuracy and depth of market participants' forecasts regarding future resource allocation
decisions and finally, the appropriateness of a risk-adjusted asset pricing specification. That
is, how accurately can market participants forecast future corporate strategic decisions and
innovations and how quickly are changes in investors' information sets incorporated into
security prices on a risk-adjusted basis? The analysis that follows will jointly focus upon
these issues.
What Are the Compounded Wealth and Cumulative Excess Return
Patterns for High and Low Pay-for-Performance Corporations?
If one is to undertake an analysis of a proposal to cap^ the compensation of a CEO or
to evaluate an investment strategy based upon Jensen and Murphy's executive compensation
arguments^, an answer to the following question seems appropriate. Do firms whose CEOs'
compensation packages are best aligned with their shareholders' interests outperform, on a
risk-adjusted as well as absolute basis, those firms with CEOs who are compensated with
^ According to the Wall Street Journal . Baltimore Gas & Electric shareholders were asked
to approve a non-binding resolution to cap top officers' pay at twenty times that of the average
worker. At Grumman Corp. , the SEC approved a shareholder vote on a proposal to jettison the
management bonus plan until the stock price regains its 1986 level of about $27 a share. Also
the SEC allowed Chrysler's shareholders to vote on a proposal limiting the size of it executives'
stock options. See Salwen [16]. Both the Chrysler and Baltimore Gas & Electric proposals were
soundly defeated. Subsequently the SEC reversed its ruling, and the Grumman proposal was not
included in its 1992 proxy. The SEC's October, 1992 regulations did not address themselves to
the issue of capping executive salaries. See Labaton [13],
^ Recently the Wall Street Journal [6] highlighted a study conducted by Kevin J. Murphy of
the Harvard Business School. Based upon the Murphy study, the United Shareholders
Association, a shareholder-rights group that had helped focus attention on the issue of executive
pay, is now praising stock-based pay. According to the Wall Street Journal . Murphy's study
found that the returns on a portfolio consisting of firms whose CEOs' compensation is highly
sensitive to stock returns earned an annual return of 29 percent during a recent ten year period.
This compares with a annual return of 20 percent for a portfolio made up of firms whose CEOs'
were least sensitive to stock returns. The article did not compare returns on a risk adjusted basis.
misaligned incentives? To this end, risk-adjusted-cumulative excess return and compounded
wealth return data covering the period 1989 through 1990^ will be analyzed for two
portfolios. The first is an equally weighted portfolio of the "best incentive" Jensen and
Murphy firms; the second is an equally weighted portfolio of the "worst incentive" listed
firms.
Traditionally the cumulative excess returns have been used in "event studies," which
focus on the stock market's reaction a surprise event, such as a dividend and/or earnings
increase, a stock split or an announcement of a hostile takeover. However, there is no clear
cut "event date" associated with the firms in Exhibits 1 and 2, other than perhaps the May-
June 1990 publication date of the Jensen and Murphy pay-for-performance Harvard Business
Review (HBR) article. January, 1989 was selected as the beginning date for the evaluation of
return performance primariily because all of the CEOs given in "CEO in Early 1989"
columns of Exhibits 1 and 2 were in control at that point. It is interesting to note that nine of
the "worst" incentive CEOs in Exhibit 2 had assumed their positions within the eighteen
month period prior to January 1989. These include Messrs. Allen (AT&T), Borchelt (Central
& Southwest), Derr (Chevron), Gleason (PacifiCoq)), Johnson (GTE), Larsen (Johnson &
Johnson), Paquette (Philadelphia Electric), Renier (Honeywell) and Walter (R. R.
Donnelley). In contrast, only one of the executives in the "CEO in Early 1989" column of
Exhibit 1, Mr. McDonnell (McDonnell-Douglas), had assumed his position in the eighteen
months prior to January 1989. Thus although the length of tenure in the CEO position
^ A meaningful extension of the return measurement period beyond December, 1990 is not
practical due to sample size limitations. See footnote seven.
varied, each was in control at the start of the return measurement period. The returns
generated during the subsequent twenty-four month period reflect, in part, the reaction of
security prices to the overall economic environment but they also reflect the appropriateness
of the CEO's strategic vision and\or successful execution of his corporate strategy given the
existing economic environment.
Return Data
Data in the form of pure and excess returns were obtained from the daily CRSP
NYSE-ASE Daily Excess Return File, the NYSE-ASE Daily Return File and the Daily
NASDAQ File, all produced by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the
University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business. The CRSP Excess Returns series
contain daily returns for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) - American Stock Exchange
(ASE) individual stocks in excess of the daily returns of a portfolio of similar risk stocks.
There are two excess return series. One is based upon a firm' systematic risk (i.e. beta). See
Scholes and Williams [18] for a discussion of how beta values are computed for individual
firms. The other excess return series utilizes the standard deviation of the daily raw return
series for it portfolio risk ranking. See [3] for a detailed discussion of the specifics for both
of these excess returns calculations. To obtain these portfolios, the NYSE-ASE stocks are
divided into ten risk classes or portfolios. Each day, a given firm's excess return is
calculated as the difference between that stock's return less the return on the portfolio to
which the firm has been assigned.
The majority of the "top twenty-five" firms given in Exhibit 1 are listed on either the
NYSE or ASE. Two, PACCAR and MCI are not; these firms trade in the over-the-counter
(OTC) market. Accordingly, CRSP NYSE-ASE excess return data are not available for these
OTC firms. However, daily returns for both PACCAR and MCI are available on the CRSP
NASDAQ file. As a result it is possible to replicate the CRSP beta and standard deviation
portfolio assignment procedures for the OTC finns."* Once the various risk-adjusted
portfolios were determined, daily excess returns were calculated for PACCAR and MCI. All
of the "bottom twenty-five" firms seen in Exhibit 2 are traded on either the NYSE or ASE.
Given these data, monthly excess returns for each security were calculated based upon the
geometric growth patterns of the daily returns during the calendar years 1989 through 1990.
Next, equally weighted individual monthly portfolio returns were estimated for the "best" and
"worst" portfolios. Finally, beginning in January 1989, a "cumulative sum" of each
portfolio's monthly excess returns was calculated.
In a similar way, the daily raw return series were used to derive a monthly raw return
for each of the twenty-five "worst" and "best" firms as well as the Standard and Poors (S&P)
Index 500 Index. These 1989 through 1990 monthly raw returns were also based upon the
daily geometric daily returns within a given month. Next these monthly raw returns were
used to generate compounded wealth relatives for each firm as well as the S&P 500 over the
period January, 1989 through December 1990. Two equally weighted, "buy and hold"
portfolios were generated by averaging across the twenty-five "worst" and "best" incentive
firms' compounded wealth returns.
Recent work by Fama and French [5] has raised serious concerns regarding the
* Beta and standard deviation breakpoint levels for the risk-adjusted portfolios were obtained
from the CRSP Research Office.
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usefulness of systematic risk or beta in explaining cross-sectional variation in stock returns.
However, they demonstrate that firm size and market-to-book equity values do explain cross-
sectional variation in average stock returns. To account for the possibility that firm size
(measured by sales) as well as industry effects may play a role in the return generating
process, each of the fifty corporations in Exhibits 1 and 2 was assigned to a industry matched
portfolio of comparable size firms. A listing of the firm's in each portfolio is provided in the
Appendix. The primary source for these firms was Business Week's "Corporate Scoreboard"
for the third quarter 1988 [14]. In addition various issues of the Value Line Investment
Survey and S&P's Industrial COMPUSTAT Manual were also used to identify firms for the
matching portfolios. Once the matching firms were identified, monthly raw returns were
generated from the geometric growth pattern of the daily returns. The matching firms were
placed in equally weighted industry portfolios and an average monthly returns were estimated
for each portfolio. In turn, these matching portfolio returns were subtracted from their
comparable "worst" and "best" incentive firm's return. These "size and industry" adjusted
returns were average across the twenty-five "worst" and "best" incentive firms, thereby
creating an alternative monthly "size and industry" adjusted excess return for two equally
weighted portfolios. Finally beginning in January, 1989, cumulative sums of these
portfolio's monthly excess returns were generated.
Raw Return and Cumulative Excess Return Patterns
The raw returns of the "best incentive" and "worst incentive" portfolios and the S&P
500 are given in Panel A of Exhibit 3. The beta, standard deviation and size-industry based
cumulative excess returns are in Panel B.
From the Jensen and Murphy pay for performance perspective, the raw return and
cumulative excess return patterns in Exhibit 3 are somewhat anomalous. A buy and hold
investment in the S&P 500 at year-end 1988 would have generated a 29.44 percent return
during 1989. However, by the end of 1990, that investment would have been 23.07 percent
greater than its initial value. A strategy of investing in an equally weighted portfolio of the
twenty-five "best" aligned firms would have yielded a return of 28.75 percent during 1989.
By the end of 1990 this portfolio would have been only 6.75 percent greater than is original
value. Over this two year period, the "best" portfolio underperformed the returns offered by
Treasury Bills. In comparison, the "worst" incentive portfolio generated a 32.18 percent
return in 1989, and at the end of 1990, this portfolio was 34.18 percent greater than its
initial value. Although the disparity between the "worst" and "best" compounded returns is
large, these differences are statistically significant in only six months. In three of these
months, October, November and December, 1990, the "worst" exceed the "best." In
February, March and May, 1989, the "best" exceed tiie "worst." While these raw returns are
interesting, they contain a strong bias in that they are not adjusted for risk. The data in Panel
B attempt to control for these risk differences.
During the first nine months of 1989, the beta cumulative excess return patters
generally conform to the "pay for performance" perspective in that the "worst" incentive
returns are negative and in February and March the "best" cumulative returns
,
while
negative, are better and statistically different from the "worst." During the last six months of
1990, this pattern is reversed. By the end of the period, the beta based cumulative excess
return of the "worst" exceeds the "best" by over 22 percent, but the differences during the
10
last six months of 1990 are not statistically significant.
The standard deviation based cumulative excess returns in Panel B of Exhibit 3 are in
general similar to their beta counter parts, although they tend to be larger. Again during the
last six months of 1990, the return pattern is the inverse of what one might expect from the
pay for performance perspective. The December, 1990 spread of 22.18 percent between the
"best" and "worst's" cumulative excess return is statistically significant at the five percent
confidence level.
Based upon the beta and standard deviation cumulative excess returns, one would hard
pressed to advocate that shareholders in corporations with pay-per-performance CEOs
consistently earn higher risk adjusted returns vis-a-vis shareholders in corporations with
"misaligned" CEO performance incentives. These data suggest that during most of 1989 and
early 1990, there was no large difference between the cumulative excess return performance
of the "best" and "worst" firms. However, in June, 1990, after the publication month of the
Jensen and Murphy HBR paper, the cumulative excess return pattern for the "best" and
"worst" appears to be the inverse of the relationship that Jensen and Murphy suggest,
although these differences are in general not statistically significant.
Although these data appear to contradict position taken by ECM-pay for performance
advocates, one can construct a persuasive argument in support of a reversal of return
performance in which the "worst" should outperform the "best" subsequent to the publication
of the Jensen and Murphy HBR paper. Consider the following. The twenty-five "best" and
twenty-five "worst" CEO incentive firms are large corporations with major institutional
investor foUowings. Although there is a tendency for the "worst" incentive CEOs to have
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been at the helm for a shorter time period vis-a-vis their "best" incentive counter parts,
major institutional investors and advisors such as the California Public Employees'
Retirement System (CALPERS) or the members of the Council of Institutional Investors
would be aware of these CEOs' strategic vision and managerial profiles. Given the visibility
of these corporations and their CEOs, it is quite likely that these firms' stock prices would
have incorporated the expected value of future positive (and quite possibly negative) NPV
investments. If these CEOs and their policies are entrenched, one would not expect nor does
one observe extremely large positive or negative cumulative excess returns. Although during
1989 the "best" in some instances outperform the "worst" in a statistically significant
manner. Enter Professors Jensen and Murphy who fire a shot across the bow of twenty-five
corporations and CEOs whose compensation is judged to be "least aligned" with the interests
of their shareholders. By revealing this compensation "squalor" to the disinfectant of public
exposure, the probability that an entrenched CEO and\or corporate board would undertake
shareholder wealth enhancing actions increases. The embarrassment of a misaligned and/or
unresponsive CEO might well force outside directors to come to grips a significant corporate
governance dilemma. As these possibilities entered the market's information set, large and
positive cumulative excess returns could easily be generated for the "worst" aligned firms.
Even though there may be no need for a change in the governance and compensation
structure of the "best" aligned firms, one might anticipate a reaction for these firms also.
This line of reasoning suggests that the exposure of a group of CEOs whose compensation is
closely aligned with the shareholders but is considered "grossly excessive" by the media
and\or populist politicians might result in negative market returns. There is some interesting
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evidence in Exhibit 3 beginning in June 1990 in support of the viewpoint. The attention
generated by the Jensen and Murphy HBR article could clearly have played a role in bringing
the CEO compensation issue to the public's attention. The expected fallout from the market's
perspective could be legislative initiatives limiting and\or taxing excessive CEO
compensation. These initiatives would tend to uncouple CEO incentive-shareholder
alignment, and thereby reduce market returns.
Unfortunately, the size-industry based cumulative excess return patterns also seen in
Panel B of Exhibit 3, provide no strong compelling corroboration for the disinfectant
exposure-compensation realignment-ECM viewpoint. The cumulative returns for the "best"
are negative and tend to decline consistently through the period, with a jump downward in
June of 1990. In contrast the "worst" aligned firms' cumulative returns are generally positive
and increasing. There is, however, no statistically significant difference between the size-
industry cumulative returns. On balance the return data in Exhibit 3 do not at first blush
strongly confirm or reject the pay for performance expected return patterns. But an
interesting and logically consistent reaction for the "worst" and "best" aligned firms is
apparent in June 1990. The market could have interpreted the exposure of a misaligned CEO
as a justification for positive change. In addition, the presence of "excessive" but aligned
compensation patterns could presage legislative interferences and an uncoupling of
shareholder and management interests. However, it is possible that there are two additional
factors that may be generating these results. Clearly these require consideration.
CEO Turnover
Several papers have investigated the impact of top management changes on share
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prices. Wamer, Watts and Wruck [20] found an inverse relationship between a firm's share
price performance and the probability of a management change. However, they could not
detect a price reaction at the announcement of a top management change. Weisbach [20]
found a relationship between excess returns and CEO replacement by corporate boards
dominated by outsiders. Weisbach suggests these data are consistent with the view that
directors increase the value of the firm by removing bad management. Klein and Rosenfeld
[12] point out that firms which pay greenmail experience above average management
turnover within one year of the payment. These greenmail firms experience positive
cumulative excess returns preceding a management change. In contrast, a random sample of
other firms with management changes had negative abnormal returns. Gilson [7] has shown
that almost all senior management change takes place because of financial distress or poor
financial performance.
This empirical evidence suggests that management change might muddy the water and
affect the return patterns for the "best" and "worst" incentive portfolios. That is, the "worst"
aligned, positive cumulative excess return pattern seen in Exhibit 3 might be attributable to
the announcement of a CEO change. As seen in Exhibits 1 and 2, only one firm from the
"best" group, Wang Labs, had a new CEO by early 1991. In contrast, six of the "worst
incentive" firms, Central & Southwest, Campbell Soup, AMP, Consolidated Edison, Detroit
Edison and Eastman Kodak had a change in their CEO by early 1991. The firms that
experienced as CEO change were removed from their respective "best" and "worst"
portfolios, and the analysis was repeated.
The raw returns of the revised "best" and "worst" incentive portfolios as well as the
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S&P 500 are given in Panel A of Exhibit 4. The beta, standard deviation and size-industry
base cumulative excess returns are given in Panel B. The "best" incentive portfolios had 24
firms, and the "worst" incentive portfolio contained 19 firms.
The return patterns seen in Exhibit 4 are in general similar to those in Exhibit 3.
However, there are some interesting differences. The returns of the "CEO retained-worst"
portfolio are lower than the returns of the "all firms worst" portfolio in Exhibit 3. This
suggests without ambiguity that the market reacted positively to the replacement of a CEO
within the misaligned firms. As one might expect the opposite appears to be true in the
"best" aligned firms; however, caution should be used for this group because only one CEO,
albeit the founder of the firm, was replaced.
There are other important differences between Exhibits 4 and 3. Although the "worst"
outperform the "best" during 1990, in no instances are these differences statistically
significant. There are five months in 1989, April through August, when the raw returns of
the "best" higher and statistically different from the "worst" aligned firms. There are also
two months in 1989, April and May, when the beta based cumulative excess returns of the
"best" aligned firms are positive and statistically different from the negative returns of the
"worst" firms. Again an interesting June 1990 turning point appears in these data. Although
the CEO change adjustment moved the returns precisely in the direction that a pay for
performance advocate would suggest, the pay for performance case is not overwhelmingly
supported. This could be attributable to an additional critical factor, changing interest rates.
Regulated-Interest Sensitive Firms
Conventional wisdom on Wall Street suggests that certain stocks are sensitive to
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changes in interest rates. These would include regulated public utilities' and a variety of
regulated financial intermediaries such as banks, brokerage firms and insurance companies.
As a group utilities tend to trade on their dividends, and are considered close substitutes for
alternative, interest sensitive preferred stock and fixed income securities. Because financial
intermediaries have a large portion of their assets invested in interest sensitive, financial
assets, these firms' stock prices are also sensitive to changes in interest rates.
It is clear that firms from these industries dominate the "worst incentive" group.
There are nine utilities and two regulated communications firms in Exhibit 2. In contrast, the
top incentive firms contain no utilities'^, but there are two insurance firms, one pipeline and
one brokerage firm among these corporations. It is possible that regulatory influences in
conjunction with the subsequent decline in interest rates could have systematically increased
these firms' returns during 1990. Because the "worst" incentive group is dominated by so
called interest sensitive firms, their positive return performance in 1990 vis-a-vis the less
interest sensitive, "best" incentive firms could be related to regulatory effects and/or the
realization unanticipated decreases in interest rates would occur. Accordingly, all firms that
experienced either a management change or fell into the regulated-interest sensitive category
were excluded from the "best" and "worst" incentive portfolios. Wang Labs, Aon
' The regulatory process for a public utility strives to determine and administer a "fair and
reasonable" rate of return for the utility's investors. Accordingly, one would not expect to
observe through time, either consistently positive or negative excess returns for regulated
utilities. This "fair return" regulatory intervention provides additional justification for excluding
regulated monopolies from the sample.
^ MCI is an unregulated communications firm. This in conjunction with a relatively low
dividend payout policy would exclude MCI from the "regulated-interest sensitive" stock
category.
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Corporation, Paine Webber Group, Coastal Corporation and American International Group
were dropped from the "best" incentive portfolios. Similarly, Central & Southwest, Campbell
Soup, AMP, Consolidated Edison, Detroit Edison, Commonwealth Edison, Texas Utilities,
AT&T, Eastman Kodak, GTE, Pacific Gas & Electric, Philadelphia Electric PacifiCorp, and
Carolina Power & Light were dropped from the "worst" incentive portfolios. These revised
"best" and "worst" equally weighted portfolios contained twenty and eleven^ firms,
respectively.
The raw returns of this revised "best" and "worst" incentive portfolios as well as the
S&P 500 are given in Panel A of Exhibit 5. The beta, standard deviation and size-industry
base cumulative excess returns are given in Panel B. A comparison of the raw returns in
Panels A of Exhibits 4 and 5 indicates that the exclusion of interest rate sensitive firms
tended to reduce the December 1990 compounded returns. A similar effect is also evident in
the alternative December 1990 cumulative excess returns. Accordingly it appears that
changes in the interest rate environment accounted for part of the return patterns seen earlier.
The raw return as well as beta and standard deviation cumulative excess return data in
Exhibit 5 suggest that during 1989, "best" aligned firms outperformed their "worst" aligned
counterparts. In three instances these differences were statistically significant June and July
for the raw returns and June for the standard deviation based cumulative excess returns. June
1990 continues to play an important role as a turning point for these returns series. At this
^ Clearly an extension of the return measurement period beyond December 1990 would be
desirable. Unfortunately, the non-regulated~CEO retained "worst" sample size declines as the
return measurement period increases. Borden and 3M had CEO changes in 1991 and 1992,
respectively. These small sizes make meaningful hypothesis testing difficult at best.
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point, the "best" aligned series tends to decline while the "best" aligned increases, although
the differences in these alternative "best" and "worst" return series are not statistically
significant.
Concluding Comments
On balance, this raw return and cumulative excess return evidence strongly suggests
that the stock market did not place a consistent return premium on pay for performance CEO
firms versus misaligned CEO incentive firms during 1989 through 1990. During 1990, the
exact opposite appears to be the case. However, there were few statistically significant
difference between the "best" and "worst" raw and cumulative excess return series when the
"worst" outperformed the "best." Are there logical explanations for these apparently
anomalous results? From the perspective of an efficient capital market advocate, these
anomalies are easily explained. Exposure of entrenched, misaligned CEOs portend significant
change in positive raw and excess returns. On the "best" incentive side, public perception of
"grossly excessive" but aligned compensation could well result in restrictive and penalizing
legislative initiatives inhibiting the governance of corporate affairs. Negative market returns
would be the inevitable anticipated result.
If one is not a strong proponent of capital market efficiency, other explanations also
exit. One obvious cause may be that the Jensen and Murphy are incorrect in their pay for
performance beliefs. Alternatively their incentive classification technique might not accurately
measure pay for performance. Another possible explanation might be that the CRSP and size-
industry excess return data do not accurately measure true excess returns. Also, in view of
the noise that is present in stock price returns as well as the small sample properties of these
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"best" and "worst" incentive portfolios, one cannot guarantee that these results will persist
over longer periods with other "best" and "worst" incentive samples. Given the "joint"
nature of the economic factors necessary to observe excess returns, clearly one or more of
these explanations could have accounted for these fmdings. However, these data point to at
least two preliminary conclusions, if one accepts the large and robust body of empirical
evidence regarding the efficiency of capital markets. First, it is likely that Jensen and
Murphy are correct but they may have overstated their case for "pay for performance. " In
addition, it unlikely that a wave of governmental regulations on executive compensation is
justifiable on cost-benefit grounds. Public exposure rather than regulations may be adequate
to insure the alignment of the interests of owners and managers.
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Appendix
Size and Industry Matched Firms
Food and Food Processing
Best Incentive Firms:
Worst Incentive Firms:
Matching Firms:
Energy •
Best Incentive Firm:
Worst Incentive Firms:
Matching Firms:
Computers
Best Incentive Firms:
Worst Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Insurance
Best Incentive Firms:
Matching Firms:
Conglomerate
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Chemical
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Hotel-Restaurants
Best Incentive Firms:
Matching Firms:
Entertainment
Best Incentive Firms:
Matching Firms:
Brokerage-Financial Services
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Castle & Cooke (now Dole), ADM
Campbell Soup, Borden
ConAgra, CPC International, General Mills, HJ. Heinz,
IBP, Kellogg, Quaker Oats, Ralston Purina and Sara Lee
Amerada Hess
Exxon, ARCO and Chevron
Amoco, Ashland Oil, Mobil, Occidental Petroleum,
Phillips Petroleum, Sun Company, Texaco and UNOCAL
Wang Labs and Digital Equipment
IBM
Apple Computer, Control Data, Hewlett Packard, NCR,
Tandy and Unisys
Aon and American International
Aetna Life, American General and Chubb
Loews
Allied Signal, GE and Tenneco
Ethyl
Air Products & Chemicals, Englehard, Hercules and Rohm
& Haas
Marriott
MacDonalds and Hilton Hotels [Matching firms create
"synthetic industry" base upon Marriott's unique lines of
business.]
MCA and Disney
AMC Entertainment, Orion Pictures, Paramount
Communications and Time Warner
Paine-Webber
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Group and Salomon
27
Trucks-Transportation
Best Incentive Firm:
Worst Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Publishing
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Pipeline
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Retail
Best Incentive Firm:
Worst Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Aircraft
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Television Broadcasting
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Health Care Services
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firm:
Food-Retail
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Home Improvement
Best Incentive Firms
Matching Firms:
Telecommunications
Best Incentive Firm:
Worst Incentive Firms:
Matching Firms:
Automotive Parts
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Paccar
Navistar
Chrysler, Federal Signal, Ford and GM
Times Mirror
Dow-Jones, Gannett, Knight-Ridder, Tribune and
Washington Post
Coastal
Transco Energy and Panhandle Eastern
Carter Hawley Hale
Sears
Dayton-Hudson, K-Mart, May Department Stores,
Melville, J.C. Penney, Service Merchandise, Wal Mart
Stores and Woolworth
McDonnell Douglas
United Technologies, Martin Marietta, Lockheed, General
Dynamics and Boeing
CBS
Capital Cities/ABC, Turner Broadcasting (Class B)
Humana
National Medical Enterprises
Winn-Dixie
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea and Kroger
MASCO
Armstrong World and Stanley Works
MCI
AT&T and GTE
Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Bellsouth, Centel, Contel,
Nynex, Pacific Telesis, Southern New England Telephone
Communications, Southwestern Bell, United
Telecommunications and U.S. West
Cummins Engine
Dana and Eaton
28
Special Machinery-Chemicals
Best Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Public Utilities
Worst Incentive Firms:
Matching Firms:
Specialty Chemicals-Manufacturing
Worst Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Electrical Devices
Worst Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Photography and Imaging
Worst Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Publishing
Worst Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Health Care
Worst Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
Electrical Controls
Worst Incentive Firm:
Matching Firms:
FMC
Deere, Ingersoll Rand, W.R. Grace and Georgia Gulf
[Matching firms create "synthetic industry" based upon
FMC's unique lines of business.]
Central & Southwest, Consolidated Edison, Detroit Edison,
Commonwealth Edison, Texas Utilities, Pacific Gas &
Electric, Philadelphia Electric, PacifiCorp and Carolina
Power and Light
American Electric Power, Dominion Resources, Duke
Power, FPL Group, Public Service Enterprise Group, SCE
Corporation and Southern Company
3M
Imperial Chemical Industries and Rhone-Poulen Rorer
AMP
Avnet, Harris and Varian
Eastman Kodak
Polaroid and Xerox
R. R. Donnelley
Delux Corporation, Dun & Bradstreet and Meredith
Corporation
Johnson & Johnson
Abbot Labs, Baxter International, Bristol Myers Squibb
Honeywell
General Signal, Perkin Elmer Corporation, Tektronix
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